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Notes
UNITED STATES PROTECTIONISM IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE-THE LAWS, THE COURTS AND THE ECONOMIC
RATIONALE-AN OVERVIEW
Recent international economic developments, particularly the de-
valuation of the dollar, have had a disquieting effect on most Amer-
icans. At such times of economic crisis, emotional appeals for pro-
tection of the national economy by use of import barriers fall on
receptive ears and become politically expedient From the time of
the Venetian merchant to the recent reopening of China to the United
States, foreign trade has always been viewed with a combination of
naive curiosity and guarded suspicion. The treasures of foreign
countries are prized both for their novelty and their usefulness. Yet,
we are always wary of the strangers "bearing gifts." Most Americans
(and indeed most nationals, whatever their country) view international
trade with this dual perspective and become suspicious when the
benefits become shrouded in economic crisis. Unfortunately, most
discussions of international trade never evolve above the emotional
level. The lawyer dealing with international transactions cannot
afford the luxury of ignorance or emotionalism in this area; he must
understand the form which protectionism takes.
The following overview of the extensive and complex phenomenon
of protectionism in the United States begins with a hypothetical
situation similar to one which could lead a practitioner on his first
foray into the specialized world of international trade. In the first
section we shall examine "classification," an area of critical importance
to the importer. The second section discusses the Customs Court and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the forums in which most
trade cases are decided, and will look briefly at the type of cases which
may arise and the procedures for resolving them. The final section
examines economic arguments for protectionism, with particular em-
phasis on tariffs, the primary protective device employed by the
United States.
I. CLAssImCATIoN, A SmAvknc QuESTION
Most writers who describe customs classification discuss the general
approach to the tariff schedules rather than how any particular product
might be classified. Apparently, they consider the product approach
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to be of limited value in view of the tremendous number of diverse
products which are imported annually. However, I will proceed on
the basis that there is some practical merit to the product approach.
Consider the following hypothetical situation. A prospective en-
trepreneur is interested in importing a full line of manufactured
products consisting of handicrafts, predominately wood carvings. He
knows the manufacturer's price and the cost of shipping in quantity,
and has an idea of the price at which he can sell these items. There
remains only the question of duty in assessing the prospects of such a
venture. Can he pay the duty and still remain competitive?
The Tariff Schedules of the United States (T.S.U.S.) published by
the Tariff Commission give the rates applicable to any imported
product. The schedules are also set forth in their entirety, including
general headnotes, in 19 United States Code § 1202 (1970) [herein-
cited as U.S.C.]. When examining the schedules, it is always helpful
to initially read the general headnotes and consider them in reference
to the question involved. General Headnote 3 pertaining to rates of
duty is the first headnote deserving comment. It describes particular
arrangements for products coming from the Philippine Republic and
Canada.' If the hypothetical woodcarvings are imported from either
of these countries, this headnote may be of some importance. More
importantly, however, it distinguishes between the two rates of duty
applicable to every item. After each item there are two columns, each
listing a different rate. Column 1 is the lower rate and pertains pri-
marily to products imported from noncommunist countries. Column 2
lists the rate at which products coming from communist countries2
are to be taxed and to a large extent reflects the tariff rates in the
original Tariff Act of 1930.3 Headnote 4 deals with the methods of
modifying rates;4 headnote 5 lists intangibles to which the schedules
are not applicable;5 and headnote 6 describes the circumstances in
which packaging containers may be subject to tariff.6 Headnote 7 is
particularly noteworthy7 in that it provides that articles subject to
different rates of duty may be subject to the highest rate if the con-
signee does not adhere to procedures specified therein for facilitating
1 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 3). The reference in this par-
ticular headnote to Cuba is no longer applicable.2 Although the communist-noncommunist distinction is not teehnically correct,
since Poland and Yugoslavia are column 1 countries, it will suffice for the present
discussion.
a Audett, Customs Law-A Brief Review and Discussion, 25 Sw. L.J. 441, 450
(1971).
4 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 4).
r 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 5).
6 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 6).
7 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 7).
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inspection. Headnotes 8 and 9 give abbreviations and definitions to
be used throughout the schedules.8 Headnote 10 is extremely im-
portant.9 It contains general interpretive rules which are to be applied
when determining a product's classification and will be referred to in
this discussion when necessary to distinguish between several possible
classifications.
Turning now to the tariff schedules, we find that there are eight
schedules, each divided into parts and subparts containing several
numbered items. After the item number a description is given, fol-
lowed by the rate of duty for the particular item. The schedules are
entitled, (1) Animal and Vegetable Products; (2) Wood and Paper,
Printed Matter; (3) Textile Fibers and Textile Products; (4) Chemical
and Related Products; (5) Nonmetallic Minerals and Products; (6)
Metals and Metal Products; (7) Specified Products: Miscellaneous
and Nonenumerated Products; and (8) Special Classification Pro-
visions. The first schedule that would catch the eye of a person seeking
the customs classification for wood carvings is Schedule 2-Wood and
Paper, Printed Matter.' 0
Schedule 2 is divided into five parts: (1) Wood and Wood Products;
(2) Cork and Corp Products, Bamboo, Rattan, Willow and Chip,
Basketwork, Wickerwork, and Related Products of Fibrous Vegetable
Substances; (3) Wood Veneers, Plywood and Other Wood-Veneer
Assemblies, and Building Boards; (4) Paper, Paperboard, and Products
Thereof; (5) Books, Pamphlets, and Other Printed and Manuscript
Matter. Once again a logical choice presents itself, viz, Wood and
Wood Products. Looking at subparts A through F of this part, the
choice becomes only slightly more difficult. Easily excluded are
subparts A through D: Rough and Primary Wood Products; Wood
Waste; Lumber, Flooring, and Molding; Densified Wood and Articles
Thereof; and Wooden Containers. The two remaining subparts are
catch-all headings: E, Miscellaneous Products of Wood, and F,
Articles Not Specially Provided For, of Wood. Investigation of both
of these subparts on an item by item basis now becomes necessary.
Subpart E-Miscellaneous Products of Wood, contains fifteen separate
classifications from Wood doors with or without hardware to House-
hold utensils and parts thereof, all the foregoing not specifically pro-
vided for, of wood. As this last classification indicates, all the other
8 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnotes 8 and 9).
9 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 10).
10 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970). General Headnote 10(b) points out that "the
titles of the various schedules, parts, and subparts and the footnotes therein are
intended for convenience in reference only and have no legal or interpretative sig-
nificance."
1973]
KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL.
items in subpart E were household items designed for some utilitarian
purpose. Inspection of subpart F is therefore necessary. Subpart F
begins with a headnote which states, "[t]his subpart covers all products
of wood which are not provided for elsewhere in the tariff schedules."
Within this subpart there are only two items, the last of which, item
207.01, has no bearing on our problem. Therefore, with relative ease
we arrive at a customs classification for the wood carvings as item
207.00, Articles Not Specifically Provided For, of Wood, rate of duty
in column 1, 8% ad valorem, and in column 2, 33V/7, ad valorem.
For substantiation of this conclusion, it is helpful to check with Sum-
maries of Trade and Tariff Information,". a publication of the United
States Tariff Commission. In the discussion of item 207.00 found
there, the first article mentioned is wood carvings. "Such carvings
consist of figurines and novelties (many of which are produced by
machine) for display and decoration in homes and offices."'
To move confidently to another part of the problem at this point
would be premature. The classification at which we arrived, i.e.,
207.00, is a spillover provision designed to encompass those items not
described more specifically elsewhere in the tariff schedules. The
rules of interpretation in General Headnote 10 state:
(c) an imported article which is described in two or more pro-
visions of the schedules is classifiable in the provision which most
specifically describes it .... 23
Thus, our original designation as woodcarvings may have been im-
precise. If carved picture frames are among the articles the prospective
importer plans to purchase, on closer inspection we discover that
subpart E lists item 206.60, picture and mirror frames, of wood. If
this example does not make one readily aware of the inherent danger
of imprecise characterization, a few more examples may be enlighten-
ing.
Suppose the products sold by the foreign manufacturer are chess
sets with carved wooden figures and wooden inlaid board. Careful
search of the schedules will uncover, in Schedule 7, item 734.15 which
encompasses, "Chess... and other games played on boards of special
design, all the foregoing games and parts thereof (including their
boards) .... "4 The rate of duty here is two percent greater for
column 1 countries than the comparable rate on item 207.00. The
112:2 TauRJF ComM'N, SU1MMABES OF TADE Am TABWF INFOMATION 111
(1968).
1.2 id.
13 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (General Headnote 10(c)).
14 19 U.S.C.§ 1202 (1970) (Schedule 7 (734.15)).
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erroneous classification would be even more dramatic and costly if a
portion of the imports consisted of handcrafted ship models. In Sawers
v. United States,15 this point was raised, the importer contending
that his model boats, of chief value wood,'16 should be classified under
item 207.00 rather than item 737.15, the collector's determination. The
rate of duty for item 737.15 was 35% ad valorem.17 The importer
contended that because these models were of such high quality and
value they were not of the type contemplated in 737.15; however, the
Customs Court found no language in the schedule "differentiating
between types of model boats with respect to value, quality of crafts-
manship."18 In this case, the difference in amount of duty collected
under the two classifications was almost 20% of the purchase price!
A more interesting conflict might arise between item 207.00 and
item 737.40 (toy figures of animated objects). In United States v.
Abercombie & Fitch Co.,19 the importer succeeded in his claim that
this latter classification was not applicable to miniature figures repre-
senting a hunt group. This case arose under the original Tariff Act of
1930, prior to a significant revision in the wording of this classification
which might produce an opposite result today. Under the old law
the term "toy" was defined as "an article chiefly used for the amuse-
ment of children, whether or not also suitable for physical exercise or
for mental development."20 The importer produced witnesses who
testified that these articles were not used "for the amusement of
children."2' The opinion of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
emphasized the limits which the word "child" placed on the meaning
of the term "toy" as used in this tariff schedule. All such hair splitting
is rendered nugatory by the present subpart E headnote in schedule 7.
Headnote 2 states that, "[flor purposes of the tariff schedules, a 'toy'
is an article chiefly used for the amusement of children or adults."22
Of course, the opportunity for haggling over the definition of the word
"amusement" is still present.
Hopefully, these examples, while not exhaustive, have demonstrated
some of the pitfalls which await the unsuspecting in the field of
customs law. The safest approach is to let the Bureau of Customs do
15 285 F. Supp. 852 (Cust. Ct. 1968).
36 When designations in the tariff schedules speak of an item "of chief value
wood . . ." they mean that if component materials used in the finished product
were valued separately, then one material would be valued greater than all other
component parts.
17 Today the rate is 17.5% ad valorem.1 8 Sawers v. United States 285 F. Supp. 852, 854 (Gust. Ct. 1968).
19 20 C.C.P.A. 267 (1932).
20 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 1513, 46 Stat. 660.
21 United States v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 20 C.C.P.A. 267, 270 (1932).
22 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970) (Schedule 7) (emphasis added).
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the initial footwork. An exporter to the United States or an American
importer may obtain a binding ruling on the tariff classification and
rate of duty of specified merchandise before shipment to the United
States. The Commissioner of Customs requires the following in-
formation to determine the prospective rate of duty: (a) a complete
description of the goods, or when a written description is inadequate,
samples, sketches, diagrams, or other illustrative material may be sent,
(b) the method of manufacture or fabrication; (c) specifications and
analyses; (d) quantities and costs of the component materials with
percentages if possible; and (e) information available concerning the
commercial designation and chief use in the United States. 23 The
prospect that a foreign supplier may be reluctant to provide all of this
information is always present. If the information furnished is ade-
quate, the Bureau of Customs will make a binding decision upon
which the importer can rely as a basis for placing or accepting orders
for goods. Such decisions cannot be later changed by an administrative
decision to impose a higher rate of duty without public notice of the
proposed change to afford interested parties an opportunity to make
written representations of the correct rate of duty for the merchandise.24
After receiving such a binding decision the importer can then proceed,
assured that this classification is the ceiling rate of duty. While the
binding is compulsory upon the customs agents, it does not prevent
the importer from presenting a case for a lower rate by arguing that
another classification is the proper one.
This complex classification system has reached its present form
through a process of evolution reflecting changes in trade policy. The
primary function of this structure is to provide protection for domestic
businesses unable to compete in a free market system. The difficulties
of the classification system necessitate an added expense beyond the
actual amount of duty levied on any particular item which can be
characterized as a "hidden" duty. Such "hidden" duties brought about
by legal complexities are woven into almost every aspect of the laws
dealing with importation. Correct determination of the classification
of imported goods is only one of a number of problems that can arise.
Next we shall look at the courts in which such problems are first
examined and see how they are dealt with.
II. DEscRnmON OF TE COXMTS
A. Customs Court
Litigation of customs matters antedates the government of the
2 3 
BuREAu OF CUSTOMS, CUSTOMS DuTY RUni'cs ON PIOSPECTIrE IMPORTS
(July 1965).
24 1d.
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United States.25 The important position which the policies of customs
collection occupied in early America is indicated by the fact that the
first substantive statute enacted by the First Congress was the Tariff
Act of 1789.26 Customs duties were the initial and for a long period
of time the principal source of federal revenue.2 7 Under the original
Tariff Act customs suits were brought in county or state courts by a
common law action against the collector of customs. 28  Later the
action was placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district or
25 Johnson, The United States Customs Court-Its History, Jurisdiction, and
Procedure, 7 O LA. L. REv. 393, n.2 (1954). [hereinafter cited as Johnson, Customs
Court]. The colonial tariff history is summarized as follows:
Our colonial forebears [sic] also claimed and exercised the right to
levy duties on imports and exports crossing the boundaries of the respec-
tive colonies. The first customhouse erected in this country was at what
was then known as Hell Gate, on the bank of the East River adjacent to
the then small settlement on Manhattan Island, for the sole purpose of
preventing adjoining and nearby colonies from peddling their farm
products to the residents of Manhattan without paying a duty or tax
thereon.
Later, customhouses sprang up in New England to protect farmers
of that region against certain importations from the southern colonies, and
Maryland and Virginia erected their own "Hell Gates" and passed retal-
iatory measures to protect their tobacco growers.
As the population of the colonies increased and new frontiers were
opened, the rivalry grew more tense and trade problems mounted, not
only between the respective colonies, but especially in the all-important
and increasing problem of the necessity for exacting import or tariff duties
upon goods from foreign governments.
A tariff system had been in operation in the old world for genera-
tions when the American colonies were founded. History records that the
unreasonably high duties imposed upon the American colonists by Great
Britain was an important factor in fomenting the American Revolution.
For more than fifty years prior thereto a trade balance tide against the
American colonists and in favor of England had been constantly rising.
Then, from the ending of the Revolutionary War to the convening of the
first Congress, this struggling young country became financially embar-
rassed. The thirteen colonies, held together only by the Articles of
Confederation, began imposing duties on commerce between themselves
and adjacent states, but there was no organized tariff system. Despite the
fact that they had won their independence, much suspicion and bickering
developed prior to the time that the United States of America as such
came into being. Some had their tariff rates very high; others much lower,
and at least one had no tariff at all.
The situation became increasingly worse, especially government
finances; in fact, the economic conditions among the respective colonies
became so chaotic it was evident that one of the pressing and paramount
issues to be presented to the Constitutional Convention was a uniform
system of collecting tariff duties. It was therefore written into the Federal
Constitution as adopted, and which became effective March 4 1789, that
the Congress be given complete control of foreign trade and the states
surrender to the federal government the power to exact import duties.2 6 "An act for laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandise Imported
into the United States." Act of July 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 24. The Act of July 31, 1789,
1 Stat. 29 provides for the method of collecting such duties.2 7 Hess, Legal Problems of the American Importer, 35 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 32
(1967).28 Johnson, Customs Court, supra note 25, at 394.
1973]
KENTUCKY LAw JouNAL[o
circuit courts,2 9 but by 1890 this structure had become completely
unworkable. In response, Congress enacted the Customs Administra-
tive Act of June 10, 1890,30 which "codified and coordinated" the
administrative management of customs. In addition the Act established
the Board of General Appraisers, the forerunner of the Customs Court,
and granted it the powers, duties and functions of a district court.31
The present United States Customs Court was created in 1926,32 but
there was no significant change in its functions, powers and duties
from that of the Board of General Appraisers.33
The United States Customs Court is composed of nine judges ap-
pointed for life by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The President designates one of the judges as the chief
judge34 to supervise the fiscal affairs and clerical operation of the court,
make assignments, promulgate dockets, and preside at any session
of the court which he attends.35 The office of the court and official
station of the judges is in New York City,36 but the chief judge may
direct judges to proceed to any port or place within the jurisdiction
of the United States to preside at a trial or hearing. The chief judge
may issue an order authorizing a judge of the court to preside at an
evidentiary hearing in a foreign country3 7 upon application of a party
or upon his own initiative with a showing that the interests of economy,
efficiency, and justice will be served.
The Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions
brought to contest administrative decisions by customs officers with
regard to imported products. The jurisdiction of the court is set out in
28 U.S.C. § 1582 (Supp. I, 1971), and includes power to hear all
charges of whatever character within the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of the Treasury, exclusion of entry or delivery of articles, refusal of
drawback claims, and refusal to reliquidate customs entries to correct
alleged errors. Under the heading of charges a party could attack
any action causing him to make a payment to the Treasury Department
Drawback claims arise when a manufacturer imports materials, pays
the duty, and uses them to produce a finished product for export.
Upon export he will apply for a return of the duty paid. "Liquidation"
is the term given to the process the customs official uses to determine
29 Id.
30 Ch. 407, 26 Stat. 798. William McKinley, then a member of Congress and
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, sponsored the act.3 1 Johnson, Customs Court, supra note 25, at 394.
3228 U.S.C. § 1581 (1970).
33 Johnson, Customs Court, supra note 25, at 394.
34 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1970).
35 28 U.S.C. § 253 (1970).
36 28 U.S.C .§ 251 (1970).
37 28 U.S.C. § 254(b) (Supp. 1, 1971).
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the amount of duty owed for a particular item. The primary ad-
ministrative remedy an importer will pursue after an adverse liquidation
is to try and get a redetermination by the customs official which is
favorable to the importer (i.e., reliquidation).
Most actions will arise at the instance of a party entertaining one
of two conflicting interests, that is, either the importer trying for a
more favorable rate or the domestic manufacturer, producer, or
wholesaler who competes with the product and desires a high duty on
competing imports. However, explicit in the jurisdictional grant is
the stipulation that administrative protest procedures under 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1515-16 must first be exhausted before one seeks recourse to the
Customs Court
B. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Prior to the establishment of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in 1909, the United States circuit courts had jurisdiction over
appeals from the Board of General Appraisers. 38 The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, created by the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, was
designated the United States Court of Customs Appeals.39 The Court
was given exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from final decisions
of the Board.40 When the Court's jurisdiction was expanded in 1929
to include appeals from decisions of the tribunals of the Patent Office,
the name of the court was changed to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals [hereinafter cited as C.C.P.A.]. 41
The C.C.P.A. has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Cus-
toms Court in all cases.42 The Court also reviews decisions of the
Patent Office, 43 certain findings of the Secretary of Commerce,44 and
decisions of the Plant Variety Protection Office.45 More importantly,
for purposes of the present discussion the C.C.P.A. has jurisdiction to
review findings of law of the United States Tariff Commission relating
to unfair practices in import trade as defined by 19 U.S.C. § 133741
which was Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These Section 337
-3 Customs Administrative Act of 1890 ch. 407, § 15, 26 Stat. 138.
39 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, o. § 29, 36 Stat. 105.
40 Id.
41 Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1541 (1970). The 1970 amendment expanded jurisdiction
from authority to review questions of law and fact in all final decisions of the
Customs Court concerning classification of merchandise and questions of law in
all final decisions of the Customs Court concerning collection of customs revenues,
to authority to review all final judgments or orders of the Customs Court and to
review interlocutory orders of the Customs Court under certain conditions.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1542 (1970).
4428 U.S.C. § 1544 (1970).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1545 (1970).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1543 (1970).
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cases47 will be discussed following examination of cases arising under
the Customs Court.
C. Constitutional or Legislative Court?
The debate over whether the Customs Court and the C.C.P.A. are
'legislative" or "constitutional" courts was apparently settled by the
United States Supreme Court in Glidden Company v. Zdanok.45
However, the historical evolution leading to this decision is interesting.
In 1929 the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,49 that the
Court of Customs Appeals (later the C.C.P.A.) was a legislative court,
and in so doing mentioned the Customs Court: "Formerly [the
Customs Court] was the Board of General Appraisers. Congress as-
sumed to make the Board a court by changing the name."50 Justice
Van Devanter, speaking for the Court, explained that it was a mistake
to assume ". .. that whether a court is one class or the other depends
on the intention of Congress.... the true test lies in the power under
which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred."51
Congress set the stage for Glidden in 1956 and 1958 by declaring that
the Customs Court and the C.C.P.A. were Article III courts. -52 Only
seven Justices participated in the Glidden decision, and the majority
split as to the proper grounds on which to base the decision. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Harlan, with Justices Brennan and Stewart
concurring, concluded that Bakelite should be overruled. He con-
sidered the congressional declaration as persuasive rather than con-
trolling.53 Justice Clark spoke for the other faction of the majority
which believed that the jurisdiction of the C.C.P.A. had been sig-
nificantly transformed since the Bakelite decision: "In view of the
evolution of its jurisdiction, I believe the court became an Article I
court upon the clear manifestation of congressional intent that it be
such."54 Although the basis on which the C.C.P.A. is regarded as a
"constitutional" court may be questionable, its status as such no longer
seems to be in doubt. The same is probably now true of the Customs
Court5 5 Therefore, both courts are limited by the case or controversy
47 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
48 370 U.S. 530 (1961).
49279 U.S. 438 (1929).
(5 Id. at 457.
51 Id. at 459.
52 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 211, 251 (1970).
53 370 U.S. 530, 542 (1961).
54370 U.S. 530, 588 (1961). Chief Justice Warren concurred with this
opinion.
55 See Eastern State Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 280 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
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requirements of Article III of the Constitution and cannot give ad-
visory opinions.
D. The Parties and Types of Cases
As stated above, the parties interested in customs litigation come
from two different categories and seek antithetical results. The
majority of the cases involve classification or valuation of a particular
product being cleared through customs. Importers desire classification
of an item under a heading that gives them the lowest possible rate of
duty and, since the rate is usually an ad valorem percentage, the lowest
possible valuation of the product. Domestic businessmen who must
compete with the imported product are obviously desirous of a higher
rate and value decision. Although this type of litigation is the most
common, various other situations generate customs litigation. ' -
The Customs Court cases arising under Section 336 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended,56 deal with Presidential action changing
rates of duty or valuation of a particular item in conjunction with
Tariff Commission findings. Dumping of foreign goods into the United
States market is controlled by the Anti-dumping Act of 1921.57 A
specific form of dumping involving the imposition of countervailing
duties is provided for in Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended. 8 Cases may arise with respect to the President's action
under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to modify concessions enacted
in trade agreements.59 Similarly, Presidential action taken under Sec-
tion 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 to protect domestic
agricultural programs may be a source of litigation.60 Finally, actions
arising under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are handled in the
C.C.P.A. 1
E. Judicial Review
In examining judicial review of various trade laws the key factor
is the scope of review. Because of the extensive delegation of power
over foreign trade matters by Congress to the executive, the judiciary
has tended to exercise a narrow scope of review in most of these areas.
1. Section 836
Under Section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the Tariff
56 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1970).
57 19 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162-66, 170-78 (1970); 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 161, 167-69
(Supp. 1973).
5819 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
59 19 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
60 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1970).
6128 U.S.C. § 1543 (1970).
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Commission advises the President of possible changes in the rate of
duty or in the valuation basis to equalize the cost of similar domestic
and foreign articles. Prior to rendering such advice, the Tariff Com-
mission must hold hearings after giving public notice to afford reason-
able opportunity for interested parties to be present, produce evidence,
and be heard. The President makes the ultimate determination to
increase or decrease duties, but he is limited to those changes recom-
mended by the Commission.02 Section 336 represents a change from
Section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922,03 which is superseded, to the
extent that in the prior act the President was not limited to the recom-
mendations of the Commission when exercising his discretionary
power. However, the basic functions of the President and the Com-
mission under the present statute are the same as under Section 315
of the old act. Therefore, case law under the Tariff Act of 1922 is
still applicable to the revised procedure.
Judicial review of the administration of Section 336 is governed by
Sections 501,64 514,65 515,66 and 51667 of the Tariff Act of 1930. If
there is an increase in the rate of duty, the importer may appeal under
Sections 514 and 515; where the action in question is a change in the
basis of valuation, the appeal must be pursued under Section 501.
The domestic producer may appeal decreases in the rate of duty under
Section 516(b) and (c).
The scope of review which the Customs Court and the C.C.P.A.
has exercised under Section 336 has vacillated. In light of the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. George S. Bush & Co.,68 the scope
of judicial review is apparently quite narrow. Review should be
limited to an examination of whether the Commission has conducted
hearings with proper notice and whether the action taken by the
President was within the prescribed statutory rate and value restric-
tions and within the scope of the notice. 9 Bush prohibited the lower
courts from continuing the practice of looking beyond the notice and
findings of the Commission. In so doing, the lower courts had been
incorrectly examining the Commission's advice and substituting their
62 19 U.S.C. § 1336(c) (1970).
63 Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 941.
64 19 U.S.C. § 1501 (1970).
65 Id. § 1514.
661d. § 1515.
67 Id. § 1516.
68310 U.S. 371 (1940).
69 See Metzger & Musrey, Judicial Review of Tariff Commission Actions and
Proceedings, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 285, 305 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Metzger
& Musrey, Judicial Review].
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judgment for that of the President."° The virtually unlimited power
of Congress in foreign trade regulatory matters has within constitu-
tional limits been delegated to the President. The judgment of the
President that the facts indicate a need for a rate change "is no more
subject to judicial review under [the] statutory scheme than if Con-
gress itself had exercised that judgment."71
The significance of Section 336 has decreased.72 The Trade Agree-
ment Act of 1934 made it applicable only to articles not covered in
trade agreement concessions with other countries.73 The number of
such articles is now extremely small; however, litigation under this
section is still considered important because of the functional similarity
between Section 836 and other regulatory statutes administered by
the Tariff Commission.74
2. Anti-dumping
Judicial review provisions under the Anti-dumping Act of 1921 are
the same as those just discussed. The essential elements of dumping
are sales at less than fair value and injury to an industry in the United
States.75 The power delegated by Congress in this act differs from
Section 886 power in that under Section 386 the decision to act upon
the Commission's recommendation is within the discretion of the
President, whereas under the Anti-dumping Act a determination of
dumping makes the imposition of duties mandatory.
76
In addition to finding sale and injury, the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Tariff Commission are required by statute to publish a state-
ment of reasons.77 Thus the Customs Court and the C.C.P.A. have a
legitimate judicial function to perform in this area. The scope of this
review should be limited to whether in light of the reasons promulgated,
the determinations have a rational basis in law. If the court were to
conclude that there is no rational basis in law for the determinations
or that the reasons do not provide an adequate basis to render a
determination, then it should set aside the value and price determina-
tions of the appraisers and remand the case for further administrative
70 Id.
71 George S. Bush & Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940).7 2 Metzger & Musrey,Judicial Review, supra note 69, at 306.
7319 U.S.C. § 1352(a) (1970).
74 Metzger & Musrey, Judicial Review, supra note 69, at 306.
75 See generally Weeks, Introduction to the Anti-dumping Law: A Form of
Protection for the American Manufacturer, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 182 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Weeks, Anti-dumping]. The elements of dumping will be explained
in greater detail in section three.76 See Metzger & Musrey, Judicial Review, supra note 69, at 327.
7719 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
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proceedings. Such proceedings would be for the purpose of making
a new determination on the matter of injury or sale at less than fair
value or for promulgating a more detailed or intelligible statement of
reasons.
78
3. Countervailing Duties
A specific type of dumping has been singled out for special pro-
cedures termed countervailing duties.79 Under Section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 imposition of countervailing duties is provided for
when the foreign manufacturer or exporter is receiving what amounts
to a subsidy.80 An importer of merchandise covered by a countervailing
duty order may challenge the administrative decision that a bounty
or grant exists by filing a written protest under Section 514 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 within 90 days after liquidation of the entry to
which the protest applies.81 The protest is filed with the District
Director of Customs. If he rejects the importer's claim, it is forwarded
to the United States Customs Court for determination.82 Until 1971
it was thought that an American manufacturer, producer or wholesaler
could make a similar challenge to a determination which he felt was
contrary to his interest by filing a written protest under Section 516(b)
of the Tariff Act.83 However, in United States v. Hammond Lead
Products, Inc.,8 4 the C.C.P.A. recently ruled that the Customs Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Section 516(b) of the Tariff
Act to entertain such a protest. 5 The court based its decision on
what it considered to be the intent of Congress, discerned by com-
paring the language of the Section 516(b) grants with those bestowed
on the importer under Section 514. The court found that although
Congress had given the importer a right to protest all exactions of
whatever character, it had granted the American manufacturer the
right of protest only with respect to determinations concerning the
rates of duty.8 6 If the court correctly perceived the intent of Congress,
78 See FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 393 U.S. 71 (1968); Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); 2 K. DAvis, AnsmqsTRA-
TIW LAw TREATISE § 16.12 (1958, Supp. 1965).
79 Weeks, Anti-dumping, supra note 75, at 183.80 Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax
Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAw PoL.
NT'L Bus. 17, 19 (1969) [ hereinafter cited as Feller, Mutiny].
8119 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970).
82 Feller, Mutiny, supra note 80, at 31.
83 Id.
84 440 P.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
8 5 This was the first case in which an American manufacturer claimed a
statutory right to protest a negative determination by the Treasury Department as
to the existence of a bounty or grant. 4 LAw POL. INT'L Bus. 146, 148 (1972).86 Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1024, 1027
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
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it discovered a unique chapter in the history of legislation characterized
by a reluctant relaxation of trade barriers.
4. Escape Clause
The "escape clause" in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 permits
the President to impose or increase duties on any commodity which
has been the subject of a negotiated tariff concession which resulted
in increased importation of that commodity to such an extent as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a competing domestic in-
dustry.87 Under previous legislation88 there had been some question
concerning the scope of review by the Customs Court in these cases.
Although it was argued that the nature and function of the discretionary
power granted to the Tariff Commission and to the President were
the same as under Section 336 and therefore judicial review should
be limited to the same type of determinations, the courts did not so
hold. In Schmidt Pritchard & Co. v. United States, 9 the Customs
Court invalidated a presidential proclamation imposing a duty less
than that recommended by the Commission. The reason given was
that the President has discretion only to make adjustments in accor-
dance with the report of the Tariff Commission or to reject those
recommendations; he does not have discretion to impose a lesser duty
increase. On appeal, the C.C.P.A. upheld the reasoning but narrowed
the holding to invalidate only that portion of the proclamation which
did not adhere exactly to the recommendation of the Tariff Commission.
The "escape clause" of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 prohibits
such an interpretation by clearly requiring the scope of judicial review
to be the same as provided under Section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
5. Section 22
Under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the
President is authorized to impose an import fee not to exceed 50
percent ad valorem or an import quota on commodities which he finds
imported in such quantities and under such conditions as to interfere
with or undermine the effectiveness of any price support or other
agricultural program. 90 Judicial review of these actions has generally
been limited to the same scope as under Section 336 and the escape
87 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-02, 1981(1970); see STAFF OF HOUSE COm!. ON WAYS
ANDi MEANS, 90Ti CONG., 2D SESs., SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF LAWS OF
TH UNITED STATES AND RELATED MATERIALS, 67-63 (Comm. Print 1968) [here-
inafter cited as TARIFF AND TRADE LAws].
88 Act of June 16, 1951, ch. 141, § 7(c), 65 Stat. 74.
89 167 F. Supp. 272 (Cust. Ct. 1958), affd in part, 47 C.C.P.A. (Customs)
152, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960).
90 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1970). For history and status of action under this statute
see TARIFF AND TRADE LAws, supra note 87, at 64-86.
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clause.91 The notable exception is found in United States v. Best Foods,
Inc.,9) 2 where the court refused to allow the President to both raise a
quota and impose a fee by limiting the presidential discretion to a
choice between the alternatives. This construction of the statute seems
to be unduly restrictivef 3 By emphasizing the statutory use of "or"
rather than "and," the court has created a constriction in the regulation
of international trade, a complex area requiring flexibility.94
6. Classification and Valuation
Cases involving issues of classification and value comprise the
largest number of customs cases. The Customs Court assumes a more
historically judicial role in these situations than it does in any of the
previously discussed areas of litigation. Congress has passed legislation
enumerating a number of categories into which imported merchandise
must be classified. 95 In addition, statutes describe the determining
factors to be used in ascertaining a product's value for customs pur-
poses.96 Normally in litigation involving these issues, the protesting
party will introduce testimony from several expert vitnesses.97 The
burden of proof falls upon the complaining party. He must not only
overcome a presumption of correctness of the Custom Service, but
also establish the correct classification or value. To overcome the
former without establishing the latter is fatal.98
7. Unfair Competition
Section 837 of the Tariff Act of 193099 vests the Tariff Commission
with the power to conduct investigations and advise the President
concerning "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States"100 which (1) effectuate
or tend to effectuate destruction or substantial injury to an industry,
or (2) prevent establishment of efficient and economical domestic
industry, or (3) restrain or monopolize trade and commerce do-
mestically. 191 The judicial review provisions contained in this section
provide for review of Tariff Commission action. Testimony in all
91 Metzger & Musrey, judicial Review, supra note 69, at 831.
9247 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 163 (1960).
93 Metzger & Musrey, Judicial Review, supra note 69, at 339.
94 id.
95 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970).
96 19 U.S.C. § 1402 (1970).
97 Berry, The Esoteric World of Customs Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 975, 977 (1968).98 See, e.g., Whitehall Shipping Co. v. United States, 5 Cust. Ct. 422, 429
C.C.P.A. 126 (1941); Anderson Organization v. United States, 46 C.C.P.A. 47
(1958). U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
1o Metzger & Musrey, Judicial Review, supra note 69, at 287.
101 Id.
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Tariff Commission investigations conducted pursuant to this section
must be transcribed, and the written transcript along with the findings
and recommendation of the Commission constitute the official record
of the case. 02 Findings supported by any evidence are conclusive,
with the exception that prior to submission to the President questions
of law may be appealed to the C.C.P.A. by the importer or consignee
of the merchandise involved.10 3 The court may, if a satisfactory case
is presented, order that additional evidence be taken by the Com-
mission. 04 The new findings, if supported by evidence, are conclusive
on the facts and further appeal to the C.C.P.A. may be had only upon
questions of law.10 5 Although the court's judgment is final as to Com-
mission findings, the ultimate determination regarding exclusion of
the merchandise is made by the President.1 6 This presidential dis-
cretion to disregard the C.C.P.A.'s decision gave this review the
appearance of an advisory opinion and was in the forefront of the
"legislative-constitutionar' court controversy previously discussed. 07
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 has been most frequently
invoked in connection with patent suits. In the 1930's several pro-
ducers were able to exclude competing products by claiming patent
infringement without having to prove patent validity, an element
that would certainly have been in issue if the cases had taken the
normal route through the district court.08 There followed a period
of grace for importers of products covered by process patents as a
result of the C.C.P.A.'s determination, in In re Amtorg Trading Corp.,10 9
that the law did not apply to process patents. Congress closed this
loophole in 1940 by requiring that process and product patents be
treated alike.110 By 1955, the court was again deciding patent cases
in accordance with the early 1930's formula,"' but not without some
criticism.112 The situation has been further complicated by the con-
gressional declaration in 1958 that the C.C.P.A. is a constitutional
court,113 followed by the Glidden case 14 in 1962 upholding this con-
102 Id. at 288.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
10 Id.
107 See text accompanying notes 48-55 supra.
'
0 8 See Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1980); In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934); In re
Northern Pigment Co 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
109 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935).
110 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1970).
111 In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
112 Id. at 445-46 (Cole, J., dissenting).
11328 U.S.C. § 211 (1970).
114 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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stitutional court status. In the Glidden decision Section 337 was cited
as a primary source of the controversy which has necessitated the
determination of whether the C.C.P.A. is a "legislative" or "con-
stitutional" court." 5
Do patent infringement cases properly fall within the scope of
Section 337?116 Can the 1958 declaration be construed as removing
Section 337 review from the C.C.P.A., or will the jurisdiction be
retained by the court; and if so, will the Supreme Court rule that it
has been discarded?" 7 These questions do not appear to be satis-
factorily resolved.
8. Summary
In summarizing the preceding material, several aspects of these
laws as they relate to trade policy should be mentioned. Generally,
United States tariff policy since World War II has been described as
liberal. The example most often cited as evidencing this nation's
liberal philosophy is its initiative in the formation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter cited as GATT]" 8
and resulting trade negotiations implemented through the use of
GATT. Whether such trade negotiations have in fact had a liberalizing
effect on American trade has been questioned." 9 In 1971 Tariff Com-
missioner Bruce E. Clubb asserted that the United States had not
followed a liberal trade policy since 1934,120 pointing out that while
imports have increased in absolute terms, they have not increased
relative to the GNP.' 12  Although there has been removal of some
major trade barriers, offsetting barriers have been constructed.
22
The Escape Clause, the Anti-dumping Act, the Countervailing Duty
Statute, and the Unfair Trade Practices Statute have received varying
degrees of criticisms as they relate to four important concepts: (1) the
115 Id. at 582-83.
116 See Furazolidone Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-21 (November 13, 1969).
"7 See generally Metzger & Musrey, Judicial Review, supra note 69, at 306-20.
118 See generally K. DAM, THE GATT LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOmNC
ORGANIZATION (1970). The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a
multilateral economic agreement which became effective January 1, 1948. It was
developed as part of the plan to reestablish the international economy following
World War II. Today GATT members conduct over 80% of the total volume of
trade outside of the Communist countries.
119 M. KREINiN, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoics, A POLICY APPROACH 270-80
(1971) [hereinafter cited as M. KREINW, INTERNATIONAL EcoNomics].
120 Clubb, Conflicting Assumptions About International Trade: Neo-Protection-
ism or Reasonable Accommodation of National Interest?, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 192
(1971).
121 Id. at 193.
122 Id. at 193-94.
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imports at issue, (2) causal relationship to alleged injury, (3) the
domestic entity involved, and (4) the alleged injury.123 It is charged
that the issues are being defined in a protectionist way under these
laws.124 Failure to provide a meaningful standard in the Escape Clause
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate import competition
is cited as another example 125 along with evolution of fair value into a
synonym for foreign market value under the Anti-dumping Act.
126
The pliability of the words "bounty or grant" under the Countervailing
Duty Statute and the wording of the Unfair Trade Practices Statute
permits twisting the language to fit practically any situation.
127
Failure of the Anti-dumping Act and Unfair Trade Practices Statute
to adequately deal with causation requirements has a chilling pro-
tectionist aspect. 28 The Anti-dumping Act test is whether an American
industry is being injured "by reason of' the foreign products being
sold at less than fair value, but it ignores the degree of causation.
Similarly, the Unfair Practices test can apparently be satisfied by any
degree of causation. The ability to invoke the Anti-dumping Act
because of effects on industries not directly competitive with the
import give protection that is actually beyond the entity with which
it should be concerned. 129 As for the injury itself, the Anti-dumping
Act is construed in the most protectionist manner, requiring the injury
to be merely greater than insignificant. 30
Having had some sampling of the legal aspects of protectionism,
we turn now to an examination of the economic rationale upon which
this legal structure has been erected.
131
123 Rehm, How Protectionist Are Our Import Restriction Laws?, 65 Am. J.
INT'L L. INocuENrcs 198 (1971).
124 Id.
125 Id. "The Escape Clause does not distingush legitimate from illegitimate
import competition.... [T]he Escape Clause [icaly concerns itself with in-
creased quantities of imports. However, it establishes no meaningful standard to
determine when an increase is actionable, thus allowing a very modest increase to
satisfy the law." Id. at 198.
126 Id. ". . . [Tlhe critical issue of sales at less than fair value is left to the
unbounded discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. Over time, the concept of
fair value has been aligned with the concept of foreign market value in the Act
Even so, the present anti-dumping regulations make it very difficult for a foreign
manufacturer to know when he is selling at less than fair value .. " Id. at 198.
127 Id. at 199.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 201.
130 Id. This is the interpretation Mr. Rehm thinks the Tariff Commission is
now following.
1311 do not want to leave the reader with the impression that I am inferring
that economic reasons are the sole rationale for trade barriers. In fact, the next
section should demonstrate that our trade policy must be controlled by something
other than economic theories.
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III. Tim EcoNoMIc Vmw
It has already been pointed out that tariffs were originally a primary
source of revenue for the federal government.132 However, the main
objective of the United States tariff schedule today is to provide
protection for certain sectors of the national economy and to give
leverage to American trade policy.
The two main types of tariffs are ad valorem duty and specific
duty. Ad valorem duty is taxed at a fixed percentage of the value of
the merchandise being imported, while special duty is a fixed sum
taxed on each physical unit of merchandise. There is a third type
called compound duty, but it is merely a combination of the two main
types.
Ad valorem duty distinguishes between degrees of quality while
specific duty makes no such quality differentiation and in this respect
is a regressive tax. For example, with a specific duty on watches the
tax on a fifteen-dollar watch would be the same as for a five-hundred
dollar watch. The dynamic effects of ad valorem and specific duty are
also in marked contrast. During periods of inflation or recession, the
ad valorem duty maintains the same level of protection. The specific
duty has a quite different effect. During inflationary periods, a specific
duty remains static as the value of the commodity is rising; therefore,
it becomes an increasingly ineffective barrier to importers. Recession
produces the opposite effect, for as prices decline, the duty becomes a
more significant proportion of the purchase price, making it an increas-
ingly formidable trade barrier. A favorable feature of specific duty
is the ease of administration. The ad valorem duty creates valuation
problems, 3 since a customs official must establish the value of the
product before the absolute amount of duty can be ascertained. Need-
less to say frequent differences of opinion occur with respect to the
proper valuation.184
In addition to the standard tariff other duties may be imposed to
offset certain business practices, particularly dumping. This economic
discourse on the subject of tariffs and other aspects of protectionism
begins with a discussion of the effects of tariffs on a country's economy,
thereby laying the foundation for examination of the various economic
arguments concerning protectionism which are discussed in Part B
below.
132 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
133 See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
134 M. KREiN, INTERNATiONAL EcoNoMIcs, supra note 119, at 235-36.
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A. Protective Effects
Starting from a point where no tariff exists, the following takes
place when a tariff is introduced. Usually the tariff will be passed
on to the consumer in the form of higher prices.135 With the higher
price, domestic companies that could not compete at the pre-tariff
price will be able to enter the supply side of the market. Consumer
demand for the higher priced commodity can be expected to fall. If
the level of the tariff is not so high as to totally prohibit importation,
there will be governmental revenue. 36
The amount of government revenue received will depend upon
the level of the tariff. If the tariff does not decrease the quantity of
the product imported, it has no protective effects for domestic pro-
ducers since consumers are buying as many units of the product
from foreign suppliers as they were before the tariff was imposed and
therefore have not increased their purchases from domestic producers.
As long as the tariff does not decrease the purchases from foreign
sources, then the higher the tariff, the greater the government revenue.
When the tariff reaches a level which causes consumers to reduce their
purchases of the product, the tariff begins to exert a protective influence
in favor of the domestic producer. If consumer demand for the
product remains stationary, the domestic manufacturer has a larger
market because the foreign supply has been decreased. What has
actually happened is that the demand for domestic goods has increased
because the price of the foreign competing goods has effectively
excluded them from the market. Since the equilibrium price level of
the product has been increased, the quantity consumers are willing
to buy has decreased. This decrease in demand does not hurt the
domestic producer because his price has not been raised, so any
decrease in purchases will affect only foreign supplies. As the tariff
level is raised, the government receives more tax per item, but because
the demand for the imported product begins to decrease as the tariff
level increases, a point will eventually be reached where the increased
tax per unit received by raising the tariff will be offset by the decreased
demand for the product at that higher price. At this point the revenue
effects of the tariff have been maximized, and any further increase in
the tariff will decrease total governmental revenues received. In-
135 In some instances only a portion of the tariff will be passed onto the con-
sumer, and the seller will absorb the remainder by lowering his prices as will be
discussed in more detail later.
130 For graphic analysis of these various effects see C. KYNDLEBEGER, INTE-
NATIONAL ECONOMICS 106 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as C. KnMLFr-ERa,
EcoNoincs].
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creasing the tariff beyond this point is solely for the purpose of
achieving greater protection for domestic producers at the cost of
decreased governmental revenue. A further possibility is that the
tariff may be so high that domestic consumers overwhelmingly turn to
domestic suppliers, creating a demand greater than the domestic
producer can supply. Faced with this market situation, the domestic
producers will simply raise their prices until demand contracts to the
level which can be supplied.
Today, the decision to levy tariffs has long since been made. The
trend since World War II has generally been toward reduction of
tariffs.' 37 As the tariff approaches zero, companies which cannot com-
pete at the world market price level will be forced out of the market. 38
Thus, there can be no reduction of tariffs without hurting some
domestic producers.
Despite the effect on domestic manufacturers, most economists
endorse, albeit guardedly, reduction of tariff barriers. The rationale
for this position stems from the fact that most import-competing
industries tend to be relatively inefficient.139 The resources being
used by these industries could be more effectively utilized by other
sectors of the economy, particularly the export industries, considered
the most economically efficient sector of the economy. Industries that
export heavily are proven international competitors. They are able
to produce domestically and still undersell foreign competitors in the
foreign market, usually in the face of foreign trade barriers. This is
essentially what economists are speaking of when they refer to the
relative economic efficiencies of the various sectors of our economy.
The industries that must fight against foreign competitors for a portion
of the United States market are less efficient by comparison.
A number of empirical studies based on multilateral reductions of
tariff rates made since the last world war indicate that one-third to one-
half of any reduction in United States tariffs accrues to the benefit of
foreign exporters. This results from the favorable terms of trade position
137 M. Knxrun, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 119, at 268.
138 The possibility does exist that an industry that has become lax behind the
tariff barrier will be induced to improve productivity because of added com-
petition.
139 Care should be taken when using the term "inefficient." The term as it is
used here is closely linked with the theory of comparative advantage. L. YEAOE &
D. TumcK, TRADE PoLicY AND T=E PRicE SYSTEM 45 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
L. YEAGER & D. TUERCx, TRADE POLIcY].
Praiseworthy management and technology are not the same as eco-
nomic efficiency, which concerns how effectively resources are being used
to meet the demands that prevail in the light of alternatives open to con-
sumers. In the last respect, an unprofitable import-competing industry is
"inefficient." But the word "inefficiency", used in this narrow sense, invites
misunderstanding. Id.
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of the United States which enabled it to originally pass a portion of
the tariff on to foreign exporters. 140 It was also estimated that tariffs
on manufactured products would raise imports by over $2 billion.
If this tariff reduction was reciprocal, United States exports would
rise by an even higher margin. Employment increase in export in-
dustries would virtually offset unemployment in the import-competing
sector.141 The overall effect of tariff abolition would be to increase
the gross national product. It would not be a large increase, however,
because foreign trade is a small part of the American economy.
Nevertheless, a small increase in a trillion dollar economy is a great
deal in absolute terms. Why then is this potential increase discarded?
B. Arguments for Protection
There are a number of arguments supporting tariffs which econ-
omists consider to merit serious consideration. This discussion shall
begin with the more emotional pleas and conclude with the more
serious arguments. Interestingly enough, in the foreign trade sector
appeals to emotion have been better received than the more sophisti-
cated and rational arguments.
1. Cheap Foreign Labor
One of the most widely accepted protectionist arguments is the
plea to protect the job and wage level of the American worker from
cheap foreign labor. For this concern to be valid, two factors should
be present in the United States trade situation. First, those domestic
industries which pay the highest wages would face the greatest threat
from foreign competition and would have no chance of exporting.
However, the opposite is true. The primary export industries of the
United States generally have higher average wage levels than import
competing industries. 42 Secondly, the United States trade position
would tend to show deficits in countries with lower wage levels and
surpluses in countries with higher wage levels, but again the opposite
is true. Statistics show that the United States has its greatest trade
surpluses in the low wage areas of the Near East, Latin America,
140A favorable term of trade position is discussed later in this section. At
this juncture it is sufficient to note that the United States has a favorable terms of
trade position because of its vast buying power. A small country is forced to take
or leave products at the world market price, and the consumers in that county
bear the entire tariff burden.
141 M. KaES-IN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMnCS, supra note 119, at 251-52. These
figures now serve primarily for demonstrative purposes and future predictions will
have to make adjustments for significant changes in the monetary sector.
142 L. YEAGER & D. TusncK, TRADE POLICY, supra note 139, at 137. See also
LXXIV U.S. Nxws AND Woar= REPORT, Mar. 5, 1973, at 29.
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and the Communist Bloc 43 and its largest trade deficits in the high
wage countries of Japan, Canada, and West Germany. 44
Wage levels are important to industries in which labor is a very
significant cost factor. From an international perspective the United
States has an abundance of capital and a relative scarcity of labor;
therefore, it should not be trying to compete in labor intensive in-
dustries.145 For example, the textile industry of the United States,
although highly mechanized in comparison with its Asian counterpart,
still requires a significant input of man-hours to produce a finished
product. Because of their relative scarcity, American workers can
demand substantially higher wages than the Asian workers, and United
States textiles continue to cost more to produce. However, industries
in which a finished product is produced primarily by sophisticated
machinery with only a small input of labor needed are ideally suited
for the United States. Competition in these industries will come from
other highly industrialized countries and not capital poor countries.
If the United States was unable to compete internationally with
any product, it would mean that our currency was overvalued relative
to foreign currencies. The obvious solution is devaluation of the
dollar, not a tariff barrier that further distorts resource allocation. 14
Devaluation lowers the price of American products to buyers with
foreign currency. Conversely, foreign products become more costly
to purchasers using United States currency. Therefore, American
products become more attractive in foreign markets, and foreign
products become less appealing to Americans. Now that we no longer
demand that the monetary world revolve totally around us, such
adjustments are possible.
A more sophisticated argument is derived from the cheap labor
specter. This theory involves changes in income distribution brought
about by lowering tariff barriers and has been considered by some to
"apply only on very special and unrealistic assumptions."14 7 The fear
is that free access to products from foreign countries will decrease the
wage level of American labor. While this theory and the factors that
make it implausible are complex, an important point can be drawn
14 3 LXXIV U.S. NEws AND Won REPORT, Feb. 26, 1973, at 19.
144 Id.
1
4 5 It should not be overlooked, however, that there is also a qualitative differ-
ence in labor and in this respect United States labor may be more productive than
foreign labor by a greater degree than the wage level difference in a particular
industry. See P. ELLSWORTH, TiE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 106 (3d ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as P. ELLSWORTH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY].
' 4 6 See M. KhEININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 119, at 200; see
generally D. SNIDER, INTERNATiONAL MoNETARY RELATIONS 49-63 (1966).
147 L. YEAGER & D. TUERcK, TRADE Poacy, supra note 139, at 163.
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from them. Theories that depend upon tariffs to achieve domestic
economic goals are indirect and unnecessarily complicating. There
are more direct internal taxing mechanisms available that can "preserve
the gains from free trade and offset [unwanted effects]. "148 Such
methods would be more appropriate because their ultimate effects can
be more accurately controlled. Further, distributing our wealth by
domestic taxes rather than raising tariff barriers is less likely to invoke
foreign retaliation.
Protectionist's arguments such as tariffs to put foreign and domestic
industries on equal footing, home markets for home industry, and
tariffs to ward off depression are too spurious to warrant comment
here except to note that all such appeals are ethnocentric emotionalism
with no economic or logical foundation. 149
2. National Defense
Some commentators are still willing to accord the national defense
argument a place of legitimacy in protectionist theorizing. 150 Trade
barriers to protect strategic industries had merit when America was
faced with a World War II situation; but today the argument is based
on a non-existent premise, for the fear of a long war in which this
country would be cut off from vital supplies is unwarranted. The United
States is concluding the longest war in its history, and during that war
trade with noncommunist countries was unrestrained and, in fact, trade
with communist countries continuedl The Vietnam war was not the all-
out conflict of a major power struggle on the level of World War II,
but should such a holocaust occur in today's nuclear age, the only
certainty is its brevity.151
3. Anti-dumping
The term "dumping" was derived from the practice of manu-
facturers, left with an unsold supply, of "dumping" the excess in
foreign markets in which they do not normally sell in order not to
lower the price in their regular markets. 5 2 The term has come to be
synonymous with any practice which maintains different prices in
different markets. Because of the indiscriminate use of this term, it is
necessary that various "dumping" practices be distinguished at the
outset.
Persistent dumping, true to its name, is a constant sale by a
148 Id. at 166.
149 Id. at 112-20.
15o P. E.LswoRTH, INTERNATiONAL ECONOMY, supra note 145, at 225-26.
151 L. YEAGER & D. Tumm, TADE Pomcy, supra note 139, at 121-30.
152 C. In _ERBmGER, ECONOMICS, supra note 136, at 155.
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foreign manufacturer at a price below the price he demands in his
domestic market. This will normally arise when the producer has a
monopoly in his domestic market but faces greater competition abroad.
In order to compete in the foreign market prices must be lowered.
Persistent dumping is harmful to producers in the country absorbing
dumped goods, but benefits to the consumer in the form of lower
prices may more than counteract any damage.153
Sporadic dumping occurs when a producer disposes of occasional
surplus or overstock in a foreign market. This is similar to a domestic
supplier having a sale, and its effects are usually minimal.154
The form of dumping that draws the greatest criticism is predatory
dumping which is selling at a price below average cost (but not
marginal cost) with the intent of driving all competition from the
market. After gaining a monopolistic position, the producer can intro-
duce monopolistic pricing to the detriment of the consumer.155 In
order for predatory dumping to succeed, the monopolist must be able
to maintain his prices at the higher level. Although the manufacturer
may have been successful in closing down a competing plant, there is
no guarantee that competitors will not be encouraged to resume pro-
duction when prices rise to a profitable level. 156 However, these
potential rivals may be deterred by fear of repetition of the previous
practice by the monopolist. 157 The producer cannot be content with
merely driving domestic competition out of business, since foreign
producers will be encouraged by the high prices to enter this market
If the monopolist maintains his low price to discourage entrance of
foreign competitors, persistent dumping exists and consumers benefit
through lower prices.15 Therefore, a producer can be assured of
success only by achieving a worldwide monopoly,'59 which would be
difcult to establish and maintain.160 The danger of successful preda-
tory dumping must then be weighed against the "obnoxious" measures
taken against dumping which "reduce the flexibility and elasticity of
international markets and reduce the potential gain from trade."161
153 M. KRnnr, INTERmNATioNAL ECONOMICS, supra note 119, at 295.
154 Id.
'55 C. KITDLEBERGER, ECONOmICS, supra note 186, at 156.
156 Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States and
the International Antidumping Code, 57 ComRELL L. REv. 491, 502 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Barcelo, Antidumping Laws].
157 M. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 119, at 294.
158 C. KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMICS, supra note 136, at 158.
159 de Jong, The Significance of Dumping in International Trade, 2 J. WoFrD
TRADE. L. 162, 171-72 (1968).
160 Barcelo, Antidumping Laws, supra note 156, at 502.
161 C. KINDLEBEEGER, ECONOMICS, supra note 136, at 158.
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4. Developing Nations
There are two arguments that, although they have some merit, have
no application to the United States economic situation. They are the
infant industries argument and the argument for diversification of
industry. Because their application is mainly confined to developing
countries these positions will not be discussed here.162
5. Terms of Trade
As previously noted,163 because of the large import market in the
United States,164 this country can shift the tariff burden to foreign
suppliers to a certain extent, forcing them to absorb a portion of the
increase by lowering their prices. The producer is willing to do this
in order to maintain his position in the American market, since he has
no alternative market in which to sell such large quantities of goods. 165
While this reduction in price gives every indication of resulting
in a gain to the United States, offsetting factors must be considered.
The consumer does not receive the benefit of this price reduction and
will actually be paying more for the product to the extent that the
foreign exporter or importer is not willing to absorb the tariff increases.
In addition, the increase in the price level encourages domestic com-
panies not capable of competing at the lower price level to enter this
market as a supplier, thereby causing misallocation of resources in the
domestic economy. If an overall benefit still exists after these negative
elements are considered, there remains the potential for retaliation
by other nations. The ultimate result of tariff increase may be an
overall economic loss for the country.166
The final facet to be considered in conjunction with "terms of
trade" is that it is an entirely nationalistic approach to trade policy,
since any gain derived will be at the expense of another country. Such
a policy will be most effective against poorer and less developed
countries and becomes the antithesis of foreign aid.167 The complete
picture is a policy whose benefits are at best questionable and whose
drawbacks manifest themselves in the form of being branded an inter-
national exploiter of the poor.
6. Tariffs for Bargaining
A country may use tariffs as a means of obtaining concessions from
16 2 See P. ELLswoRTH, NTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, supra note 145, at 220-24.
'
6 3 See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
164 Here we are talking in absolute terms because compared to the total
domestic market the import market is small.
165 L. YEAcER & D. TuERcic, TRADE POLICY, supra note 139, at 182-93.
166 p. ELLSWORTH, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMy, supra note 145, at 224.
167 L. YEAER & D. TUERCK, TR.ADE POLICY, supra note 139, at 192-93.
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other countries on its exports, as has taken place on a multilateral level
in the GATT negotiations. 168 The threat of tariff increase or the
creation of some other type of trade barrier has been considered. As
long as this strategy brings about further lowering of trade barriers on
a reciprocal basis, then it is successful. However, to actually carry
out the threat by increasing trade barriers to obtain a stronger bar-
gaining position will create interests which will oppose the use of the
barriers for the original bargaining purpose intended.169 The result
will be an overall loss due to misallocation of resources rather than an
economic gain.
CONCLUSION
This overview of United States trade laws has hopefully shed light
on certain elements of our foreign trade sector. As demonstrated by
the section on classification, the laws are difficult to apply, primarily
as a result of attempts to protect vested interests that thrive under
trade protectionism. Laws have sometimes been enacted to protect a
specific industry from a specific threat. Incorporating such laws into
the general trade laws expands their scope, sometimes causing unfore-
seen problems because of overlap into areas not anticipated when the
law was formulated.
Turning to the courts for resolution of such conflicts has created
even more controversy, as witnessed by the historical outline of the
Customs Court and C.C.P.A. The courts' role in administration of
customs laws has been characterized by uncertainty, and their con-
stitutional nature has been questioned.
Amid all of this conflict is the irony that there is very little eco-
nomic justification for the whole structure-the laws, the courts, or the
administrators. Therefore, why do we maintain this structure? The
answer is embroiled in politics and misconceptions. Transformation
to a free trade position will involve economic hardship to some sectors
of the economy. Interests that have survived in an artifically contrived
environment are not healthy enough to thrive in the rough and tumble
of a free trade economy. These sectors shall continue to implore
their political representatives to lead the fight for protectionism. This
fight will succeed until the majority of the public is" able to grasp the
realities of the situation and persuade Congress to lift the trade bar-
riers. As long as the average American is persuaded by emotional
appeals to side against foreign competition, be will continue to sub-
sidize these vested interests through higher prices.
Levi Daniel Boone, III
168 See note 118 supra.
169 p. ELLswoRTa, INTENATIONAL ECONOMY, supra note 145, at 224-25.
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